U.S. low on leverage in Arab world
The “Arab Spring” might not have succeeded in bringing democracy to the Middle East. But it has provided powerful evidence of a different phenomenon — the illusion of U.S. influence over governments we once considered our clients.
Take Egypt. Before 2011, the Bush and Obama administrations tried to nudge the autocratic Hosni Mubarak toward democracy; Mubarak ignored the advice. Last year, the Obama administration pleaded (gently) with the freely elected Mohamed Morsy to make his Muslim Brotherhood government more inclusive; Morsy ignored the advice. Now Egypt's armed forces have seized power and the United States is begging Gen. Abdel Fattah Sisi to refrain from cracking down too hard. Will he comply? Not likely.
Whatever happened to our leverage as a superpower?
If the United States could be expected to have influence over any institution in the Arab world, it would be the government of Egypt, which collects $1.6 billion a year in American aid. But two factors have diminished the leverage that the United States once gained by doling out foreign aid — less money and more competition.
First, $1.6 billion doesn't buy what it used to. U.S. aid to Egypt has been shrinking for most of Sisi's career. Adjusted for inflation, this year's $1.6 billion is only about one-third as much as the United States spent on Egypt aid in 1986.
The military portion of that annual aid, $1.3 billion, goes mostly to buying aircraft and tanks made in U.S. factories; the non-military portion, $250 million, is little more than a drop in the bucket for Egypt's sprawling economy. Sisi and other Egyptians know this all too well — but American politicians often sound as if they haven't noticed.
Other powers have stepped in to fill the breach. Last month, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait announced that they were rushing $12 billion in economic aid to Egypt to help the military regime stabilize the economy. Those gulf monarchies had an agenda too; they fear the Muslim Brotherhood, don't yearn for the restoration of democracy, and would be perfectly happy if Sisi cracked down hard. If foreign aid creates leverage, the sheikdoms' $12 billion trumps our $1.6 billion handily.
The stakes for Egyptians are too high for U.S. advice to count for much. “We're a sideshow,” notes Steven A. Cook, an Egypt scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations. “If you're an Egyptian leader, one of your best political strategies right now is to stick it to Washington.”
For Egyptians, the message was familiar, if not entirely clear: For two decades, American politicians have threatened to pull aid if things didn't change but they never dared pull the trigger. This time is unlikely to be much different.
That doesn't mean the United States has no influence over events in the Arab world. It just means we have less sway than we often imagine — and the source of our influence might not be the size of the checks we write.
“We do have leverage, but it's not where we think it is,” said Tamara Cofman Wittes of the Brookings Institution, who ran democracy aid programs at the State Department. “What they want is international recognition. They want to be connected to the rest of the world. And they want our blessing. That may be our most effective leverage.”
Doyle McManus is a columnist for The Los Angeles Times.